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BOOK REVIEWS
By Albert B. Gerber. New York: Lyle Stuart,
Inc., 1965. Pp. 349. $10.00. In a recent issue of the Washington Law Review, Mr. Justice Douglas suggests the adoption of an editorial policy requiring
each author to indicate his special interest in the subject matter of his article.1 He
warns that too often "I fear that law journals have been more seriously corrupted
by non-disclosures than we imagine."' A similar policy ought to be adopted by the
book publishers. The obscenity field is already replete with examples of special
pleading by defense lawyers.' Yet, the dust jacket of attorney Albert V. Gerber's
Sex, Pornography,and Justice merely indicates that he is a "prominent lawyer in
Philadelphia, specializing in criminal and civil law in the obscenity and pornography field." The situation would have been clearer at the outset had the book
been subtitled, "A Defense Counsel's View."
Gerber begins his book with some general observations about "the shifting,
changing scene."' He immediately sets the tone for the rest of the text by quoting
a long passage from Judge J. Irvin Shapiro's opinion in New York v. Birch,'
in which Judge Shapiro dismissed an indictment charging that a series of the
so-called "Nightstand" 6 books were obscene. With obvious approval, Gerber calls
the opinion "outstanding."' What he neglects to tell us is that one of the books
which lower court judge Shapiro held constitutionally protected, to wit, College
For Sinners, had already been affirmed as outside the protection of the constitution by the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court, a decision
the Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court refused to review.'
United States District Judge Noel P. Fox has aptly capsuled Judge Shapiro's
opinion as "not being a correct statement of the law."9
Recognizing that any new book dealing with obscenity needs some special
justification, Mr. Gerber seeks to warrant the publication of his by the inclusion
SEX, PORNOGRAPHY, AND JUSTICE.

1
2

Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. Rav. 227 (1965).
Id. at 229.

3

See, e.g., ERNST & SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP:

THE SEARCH

FOR THE OBSCFNE

(1964).

4 Text at 18.
5 40 Misc. 2d 626, 243 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
6 The "Nightstand" books have been aptly described as "unqualifiedly pornographic and
just as obviously 'thrown together' for a 'quick sale.' Lacking literary merit, they neither
shock nor offend because they are so blatant and blunt. Written in a dull and slimy style,
they are void of subtlety and spare nothing for the imagination." Slough and McAnany,
Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom-PartI, 8 ST. Louis U. L. R.v. 279, 331 n.189

(1964).
For a more specific description of the books, which only narrowly avoided judicial condemnation on the substantive issue of obscenity by the Supreme Court, see generally A
Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (mass seizure held unlawful without
adversary hearing). For a long article dealing with the aspect of the pornography racket they
represent, see generally New York Times, Sept. 5, 1965, p. 1, col. 3.
7 Text at 28.
8 Commentaries on the Law of Obscenity, No. 2, 1965, p. 1-9, 10; New York v. Fried,
18 App. Div. 2d 996, 238 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1963), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 378 U.S.
578 (1964). Virtually identical "Nightstand" books have been repeatedly affirmed as obscene
by appellate courts. See, e.q., Illinois v. Sikora, 32 Ill. 2d 260, 204 N.E. 2d 768 (1965).
9 United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 197 (W.D. Mich. 1964),
aff'd, Sixth Circuit, No. 15792, (March 22, 1966.
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of actual excerpts of indicted materials with his case analysis. In all, he has
spread throughout the book passages and pictures from approximately ten cases.'0
The idea of bringing together examples of materials held obscene is laudable.
Too often the uninitiated get lost in discussions of the obscenity issue solely
because they have no concrete image to associate with the abstract term. Mr.
Justice Holmes had a favorite admonition, "Think things not words."' If we
could get more concrete images into the discussion the going would be unquestionably easier. 2 Unfortunately, however, Gerber violates one of the most important lessons we have learned over the years in the obscenity debate: the work
must be judged as a whole.' At one point, toward the end of the book, Gerber
rhetorically asks us, after we have read extracts from Tropic of Cancer, Pleasure
Was My Business, Fanny Hill and Candy, to "make an intelligent differentiation."'" He then suggests that the books are "pornographically speaking ...
without a distinction."' 3 Without all of the material placed in its proper context,
Gerber is right. Yet by not giving us all of the material in its proper context,
Gerber deprives us of the ability to make a constitutionally sound decision - and
his book of any special relevancy on this score.
The book itself is divided into six parts broadly dealing with the history
of the obscenity problem, the work of the Supreme Court, the various tests for
obscenity, and a review of the law today. Like many obscenity defense counsels,
Gerber treats the history of the problem as if it were all the doing of Anthony
Comstock,"6 clearly a high devil in libertine demonology. This is, of course, just
so much nonsense. The concept of decency is virtually as old as man himself."
No human society has ever existed which did not attempt to draw the line."
Today this universal aspiration of man is represented in the legal prohibition

10 Queen v. Read [Q.B. 1700] Fort. 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (The Fifteen Plagues of a
Maiden-Head pp. 56-64); King v. Curl [K.B. 1727] 2 Strange 789, 93 Eng. Rep. 849
(Venus in the Cloister or the Nun in her Smock pp. 65-67); One, Inc., v. Olesen, 355 U.S.
371 (1958) (One-The Homosexual Magazine pp. 135-41); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield,
355 U.S. 372 (1958) (Sunshine and Health and Sun Magazine pp. 144-48); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (MANual, Trim and Grecian Guild Pictorial pp.
164-67); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (Lover or A Professional
Stud in the Big City Lust Jungle pp. 260-74); Dale Book Co. v. Leary, 233 F. Supp. 754
(E.D. Pa. 1964) (unnamed nudist magazine pp. 282-83); Fanny Hill pp. 292-301; Candy
pp. 302-10; and sculpture of Ron Boise depicting a theme from Kama Sutra pp. 320-21.
11 FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 81 (Atheneum 1965).
12 When Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) was argued before the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General sent up to the Justices several crates of the vilest sort of
pornography. What had begun on an abstract plane was quickly brought down to earth, and
the basic constitutionality of obscenity legislation was affirmed. See Lockhart and McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV.,
25-26 (1960).
13 See text accompanying note 25.
14 Text at 311.
15 Ibid.
16 A 19th-century crusader against obscenity whose efforts were largely responsible for
the passage of the prototype of the present federal obscenity law, which is 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1964).
17 Biblical tradition roots the concept in the first sin of Adam and Eve. Genesis 3:7. It is
not necessary to accord the story divine origin to recognize it as an 'ancient insight into the
character of man.
18 Mead, Sex and Censorship in Contemporary Society, in NEw WORLD WRTINo (3rd
Mentor Selection) 7 (1953).
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of the obscene by most foreign countries,19 by all of the states,20 and on the
federal level by the United States. 2' Treating this legislation as an anachronistic
holdover from 17th-century Puritans or 19th-century Anthony Comstocks is the
grossest sort of historical distortion. For example; the first piece of federal
legislation aimed at obscenity, The Tariff Act of 1842,22 was passed during the
second generation of the American Republic without challenge on the score
that it was inconsistent with the first amendment. The second major federal effort, which was directed against the pornographers exploiting the loneliness of
Union soldiers, was passed during the administration of that patent precursor of
Anthony Comstock, Abraham Lincoln.2 ' Naturally enough, Mr. Gerber tells us
virtually nothing of this.
Moving from his historical treatment of the issue to a consideration of the
work of the Supreme Court in recent years, Gerber falls into what Judge Jerome
Frank has termed, "The Upper-Court Myth. ' 24 The work of the High Court
is, of course, significant. But what is happening at the trial court level is far
more important. The Supreme Court can only lay down broad rules; their
application remains the work of others. Consequently, any treatment of the
obscenity issue which fails to broaden its view to include the prosecution and
trial level becomes necessarily narrow minded.
After a brief treatment of some of the early cases which come before the
Court, Gerber takes up the now-famous Roth definition of obscenity - "Whether
to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the domi'25
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest"
- and then smugly and superciliously carps: "If this test is analyzed slowly
and carefully on a word-for-word basis it becomes evident that, far from being
a test, it is a meaningless conglomeration of words purporting to set forth a
profound equation but really saying practically nothing."2 The Roth definition
is, of course, not perfect. Indeed, Mr. Justice Brennan, its author, has been
among the first to acknowledge it.2 Apparently, however, Mr. Gerber has never
been exposed to classical learning. "Precision is not to be sought for alike in all
discussions; it is the mark of an educated man," Aristotle taught, "to look for
precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits.... "'s In light of the nature of obscenity, and after examining the test
on the functional level, we may honestly conclude - Mr. Gerber notwithstanding- that the attempt of Roth to work an honest accommodation between the
19 Among the foreign nations with obscenity legislation are Argentina, Belgium, England,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Mexico and Russia, MODEL PENAL CODE,
& 207, 10, comment, footnote 3 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). In addition, over fifty nations
are signatory to an international agreement to suppress traffic in the obscene. See Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
20 Representative state statutes are collected in Religious Institutions and Values: A
Legal Survey (1955-57), 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 416, 436 n.125 (1958).
21 The federal statutes are collected in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 n. 17

(1957).

22 5 Stat. 566 (1842).
23

13 Stat. 507 (1865)

(obscene mailing made criminal).

24 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 222-24 (Atheneum 1963).
25 354 U.S. at 489.
26 Text at 129.
27 Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (opinion of Brennan J.).
28 MCKEON, INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE: ETICS 309-10 (Modern Library 1947).

1058

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

requirements of free speech, the hopes of legitimate artistic expression, and the
demands of common decency has been brilliantly successful. Even Mr. Gerber
has had to admit that "the United States today probably has greater freedom
for the communication of ideas than any other country in the world."29 No
serious work of art has been successfully banned or suppressed since 1957, the
date of Roth. Moreover, despite the tightening of standards brought on by Roth,
the ability of careful prosecutors to secure obscenity convictions in abundance has
remained substantially unimpaired."
Only two further comments need be made here on Mr. Gerbers treatment
of the work of the High Court. Both importantly affect the quality of the book.
Evidently, Gerber does not understand the legal significance of the no-majority
opinion rule." One of the basic postulates of the American case law system
is that the decision of the majority settles the controversy. When a majority
agree on a result, the decision is final between the parties. When the majority
also agree on reasons supporting the result, the opinion expressing those reasons
is called "the opinion of the court." The precedent value of a particular case is
substantially undermined, however, when there is no majority opinion. "No
majority opinion" cases stand only for their results. The opinions may give some
indication of the thinking of individual justices, but they are not the law of the
land. Mr. Gerber's indiscriminate references to such cases as Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 2 Jacobellis v. Ohio,"3 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 4 Grove
Press, Inc. v. Gerstein,"s and Tralins v. Gerstein36 demonstrate little recognition
of this fact. Except as it was implicit within the Roth test itself,' the requirements
of "patent offensiveness," '
for example, has never been established in a
29 Text at 39.
30 The following table represents arrests and convictions on the state and federal level
for violation of obscenity statutes in which the Post Office Department aided the prosecution:
Fiscal Year
Arrests
Convictions
1957
201
175
1958
293
213
1959
315
272
1960
389
306
1961
457
377
1962
605
503
1963
761
637
1964
805
627
1965
874
696
Letter of H. B. Montague, Chief Inspector, Post Office Department to G. Robert Blakey,
Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, Dec. 20, 1965. A spot check of the
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office, United States Courts, moreover,
indicates that, at least on the federal level, most of these convictions are on guilty pleas. If
the standard were all that unworkable, would not more defendants want to litigate? Apparently, most receive probation, which probably puts them out of business. However, when
a sentence is imposed, it is high-an average of two years. One would suppose, therefore,
that obscenity prosecutions are not just "negotiated away"; they are "for real." See, e.g.,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS

31

241, 246 (1963).

See, e.g., WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 50 (2d ed. 1894).
32 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
33 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
34 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
35 378 U.S. 577 (1964).
36 378 U.S. 576 (1964).
37 See Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 191.
38 Manual Enterprise, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. at 478 (Opinion of Justices Harlan and
Stewart interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1461, not the 'Constitution).
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majority opinion of the Court as a mandate of the Constitution.3" The absence
of careful, workmanlike attention to detail like this characterizes the whole of

Gerber's book.
Mr. Gerber also spends so much time speaking of the cases the Supreme
Court has accepted for hearing that he leaves you with the impression that the
High Court never allowed an obscenity conviction to stand until Ginzburg0
and Mishkin,4 ' which were, of course, decided only after the publication of his
book. The opposite conclusion is fact. Indeed, the Court has substantively ruled
on only a handful of obscenity convictions since 1957. None were reversed by
full-scale majority opinions. Yet, significantly, the Court has allowed some
twenty-three convictions to stand by denying certiorari or dismissing the appeal. 2
Any general treatment which ignores this aspect of the work of the Court seriously
distorts the picture.
Eventually Mr. Gerber comes to the standard ploy of most defense counsels.
Speaking of the various rationales of obscenity legislation, he first concedes that
such legislation may rest on a consideration of its offensiveness to the community. He then denies that the community is justified in suppressing obscenity
out of a hope that socially undesirable behavior might thereby be curbed at least
in part." Like virtually all defense counsels, Gerber neither asks nor answers
here any of the truly lawyer-like questions. For example: who has the burden
of proof? To establish what? By what kinds of evidence? To what degree of
satisfaction? To whose satisfaction?
Gerber seems to feel that the proponents of obscenity prosecutions have the
burden of proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt by empirical evidence
to the libertine's satisfaction that obscenity immediately leads to sexual crimes.
Life is just not all that simple. Since obscenity legislation is already here, one
would suppose that those who suggest that it be discarded would have the burden
of proof to establish why.4" It would not, moreover, seem to be necessary for
one seeking to support the legislation to demonstrate that every rapist reads an
obscene book just before the crime. Indeed, why should the anti-social behavior
be limited to sexual behavior? Would it not be enough if there were some evidence
39 There is, of course, every likelihood that it will be adopted. Cf. A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"-v. Attorney General, 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).

40

41

Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).

Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
42 For a listing of these cases, see Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey
(1964-66), 41 NOTRE DAMME LAWYER 681, 783 n.841 (June, 1966).
43 Text at 318-19.

44

Text at 209, 318.

45 The rule has long been established that legislative enactments are to be presumed
constitutional. See, e.g., Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 514-15 (1899). Such a rule, of course,
throws the burden of proof on he who would seek to overthrow the act to show why. Hence,
it should not be observed, as Mr. Justice Rutledge did on oral argument in Doubleday & Co.
v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), quoted in 17 U.S.L. WEEx 3117-3119 (1948) that: "It
is up to the State to demonstrate that there [is] a danger, and until they demonstrate that,
plus the clarity and imminence of the danger, the Constitutional prohibition would seem to
apply." Such a position incorrectly assumes "obscenity" is "speech" in the constitutional
sense; it is little more than a petitio principii. Indeed, the point in issue is "obscenityspeech vel non." It is clear, moreover, as Mr. Justice Brennan brilliantly shows in Roth v.

United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, (1957), the lesson of history is that "obscenity" is not
"speech."
Properly understood, the problem is not the application of the usual constitutional
rules applicable in free speech cases, but how to define "obscenity" so as to avoid encroach-

ment on legitimate "speech."
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to link the deterioration of personality some attribute to obscenity with any
socially undesirable behavior?" Further, it would seem that other than empirical
evidence ought to be admissable on the issue. After all, our commitment to the
value of free speech itself cannot be empirically demonstrated to be sound.
Finally, since a legislative judgment is at issue, need we find more than a rational
basis to justify it? Otherwise, we would be just substituting judicial judgment
for legislative judgment.
46

The evidence may be grouped into several categories:
(1) Law Enforcement Opinion:
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover squarely blames pornographic material, in part, for the rise in juvenile delinquency, sex crimes, and sexual immorality generally. Hoover, Combatting Merchants of Filth: the Role of the FBI, 25 U.
PITT. L. REV. 469 (1964). See also Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Obscene and Pornographic Literature and Juvenile Delinquencies, S. REP. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 23 (1957) (hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 2381) for the opinions of various Chiefs of Police throughout the United States.
(2)
Clinical Testimony:
Dr. Harold Brown Keyes, in behalf of the New York Academy of Medicine, specially
petitioned President Johnson in November of 1964 to devote the full resources of the federal
government to the fight against obscene literature. The academy particularly noted that such
literature had the effect of leading young people into illicit sex relations, illegitimacy and
venereal disease. New York Times, Nov. 24, 1964, p. 24, col. 5. A statement of the Academy
is reprinted in People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 n. 4
(1963). The testimony of Dr. George W. Henry, Professor of Clinical Psychiatry, Cornell
University College of Medicine, before the Kefauver committee is also both illuminating
and disturbing. There he was asked, "Doctor . . . could children be sexually perverted by
looking at, by studying, and by dwelling upon photos of this nature and the contents of this
book [bondage pornographic material]?" He answered, "Yes." S. REP. No. 2381, supra at
10. The testimony of Dr. Benjamin Karpman, Chief Psychotherapist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, the federal mental hospital in Washington, D.C., similarly told the Committee, "You
can take a perfectly healthy boy or girl and by exposing them to abnormality, you can virtually crystallize and settle their habits for the rest of their lives. If they are not exposed to
that they may develop to perfectly healthy, normal citizens." Id. at 12. Dr. Karpman also
noted, "There is a very direct relationship between juvenile delinquency, sex life, and pornographic litrature." Id. at 13.
For a general summary of the medical testimony see PAUL & SWA.tTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAILS 292-97 (1961).
The testimony of the doctors is not without
some support in reported cases. In United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D. Md.
1961), "bondage" material similar to that referred to by Dr. Henry was found with a murder weapon of a man who had savagely killed a husband and wife and their two daughters,
and who before killing the wife had tried to perform an abnormal sexual act on her. For a
devastating rebuttal of the position advanced by a few doctors and many lawyers defending
commercial pornographers that obscenity has no harmful social consequences, see MURPHY,
CENSORSHIP: GOVERNMENT AND OBSCENITY 131-51 (1963).
(3)
Empirical Data:
The danger of perversion among the young or the corruption of their attitudes by
pornography is underlined by the finding of the original Kinsey study that few individuals
"modify their attitudes on matters of sex or change their patterns of overt behavior in any
fundamental way after their middle teens." KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 446 (1948).
The significance of vicarious conditioning in the development of human
sexual behavior is also confirmed in KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE,
645-72 (Pocket Book 1965). The most recent Kinsey report, SEX OFFENDERS, (1965), contains a statistical analysis of interviews with 1,356 men convicted of rape, homosexuality and
a variety of other sexual crimes. These men were compared with 886 non-sex offenders and
477 non-offenders. The criminals generally possessed more pornography and were more
aroused by it than the non-criminals, and certain classes of sex offenders possessed even more
pornography and were even more aroused by it than the other offenders. See SEX OFFENDERS,
Table 14, "Sexual Arousal from Pictures of Sexual Action by Possession of Pictures of Sexual
Action for Control, Prison and Sex Offenders Groups 691 (1965). For a differing of judgments on the significance of the new study, see New York Times, July 18, 1965, p. 1, col. 3.
Other empirical data is collected in Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: the Assumptions- of Anti-Obscenity Law and the Empirical Evidence. 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962).
(4) Parallel Phenomena:
All indications are that the last ten years has seen an increase in the availability of
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Gerber's book is filled with other misleading and outright inaccurate
material. Enough has been pointed out here. It remains only to consider his
conclusion and sum up. Ironically enough, when he finally takes up the question,
"Now-The Law," his analysis is not unperceptive.," Pictorial nudity alone in
reasonably good taste related to its setting is, he feels, constitutionally protected."'
No serious novel or ordinary nonfiction work will be interfered with; the status
of the "Nightstand-type" book "designed solely to capitalize on the newly
liberated sexual motif remains "a toss-up."49 Miller's books are "not really
precedents" because they "can qualify as serious 'works' with a significant sexual
theme" containing "much that is of social importance and value.... Slick
magazines, typified by Playboy, are constitutionally protected, but recent endeavors "catering to or emphasizing some form of fetishism," such as High
Heels, or which offer "simply nudity in an exaggerated, unrelated form," are
"in for trouble and may not be protected at this time."'" Any film "in reasonably
good taste" will "probably receive constitutional protection."52 Records with
obscenity. The Kefauver Committee, writing in 1956, estimated that the pornography racket
was then a $500,000,000-a-year industry. S. REP. No. 2381, supra at 3. At that time the
Post Office received annually approximately 40,000 obscenity complaints; the volume has
now risen to 128,000. Letter of H. B. Montague to G. Robert Blakey, supra note 30. Accordingly, it is a fair estimate to peg the racket today at $1,500,000,000. Other estimates are
higher. See Ogle, "Filthy Paperbacks are Taking us to the Cleaners," Marriage, January 1966,
p. 27 ($2 billion). Subject, of course, to the post hoe propter hoc fallacy, and the difficult
issue of causation, we may also note the following parallel increases in antisocial behavior,
which has been attributed, at least in part, to the rise in obscenity.
(a)
Juvenile Delinquency:
During 1964 arrest of young persons under 18 for criminal acts rose 15%. This was
the 16th year of consecutive increase Since 1958, police arrests of juveniles have increased
twice as fast as the young population growth. For all criminal acts young offenders made
up 48% of all arrests. In 1963, persons under 18 represented 8% of the arrests for murder,
18% for forcible rape, 26% for robbery, 14% for aggravated assault, 50% for burglary, 51%
for larceny, and 63% for auto thefts. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1965, p.
343; Id. 1966, p. 306. On the meaning of criminal statistics, compare, Beattie and Kenney,
Aggressive Crimes 364 ANNALS (March 1966) 73-85, with Ottenberg, Critics of Crime
Statistics 34 F.B.I. LAw ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (May 1965) 22-25.
(b) Illegitimacy:
In 1940, the illegitimate birth rate was 7.1 per 1,000 unmarried females. Despite the
widespread availability of birth control information and devices, that rate had by 1963

increased to 22.5.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

1965, Chart No. 53, p.

51. The significance of that figure, particularly for the young, may be seen when we recognize that one out of every ten girls 15-19 will have an illegitimate child next year. Ibid.
(c) Venereal Disease:
In 1955, there were 362,602 cases of venereal diseases among civilians reported to the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Despite the widespread availability of such
drugs as penicillin, by 1963 that figure had jumped to 404,405. Id. Chart No. 105, p. 82.
Reported cases represent only about one-fourth of the probable actual incidents. There are
probably 1,100,000 cases of V.D. each year. Promiscuity among teen-agers and homosexuals
is thought to be the chief cause of the rise. The teen-age group, 15-19, for example, have
a V.D. rate double that of all other groups. TODAY'S V.D. CONTROL PROBLEM (American
Social Health Association, 1965) 13-20.
47 Text at 285. Compare, however, Gerber's comment that "to a considerable extent
the majority of the United States Supreme Court has been moving in [the] direction" of the
"nothing is obscene position," text at 196, with the Ginzburg, Mishkin, and Fanny Hill trilogy,
Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966), Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958
(1966), A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
48 Ibid.

49

Text at 286.

50
51
52

Text at 286.
Text at 286-87.
Text at 287.
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sexual motifs will be treated like books.5 3 Live performances will probably be
left up to the "critics and the patrons."54 Finally, Gerber observes, "history has
demonstrated that the High Court grows weary of specific fields, and ultimately
finds a mechanism for eliminating the flow of cases." 55 This result, he says, "is
inevitable in the obscenity field." 5 Whatever criteria the Court establishes, it
must be "practical."' 7 Neither "almost anything, if indicted, is obscene" nor
"practically nothing, if you fight hard enough, is obscene" will be adopted."
Some, as yet undetermined, "intermediate solution" must be found. 9 With this
last bit of obviousness, disagreement is not possible. Nevertheless, it must be
observed that Gerber's practical predictions fit comfortably with the recent
pronouncements of the Court in the Ginzburg, Mishkin, Fanny Hill trilogy.6 0
Thus, his clients and readers will not go wrong if they take his advice but ignore
his reasons.
The dust jacket of Sex, Pornographyand Justice indicates that it is attorney
Gerber's "second full-length book." Hopefully, the first was better than the
second. Should he write a third, there is every possibility available to him for
improvement.
G. Robert Blakey*
A THOUSAND DAYs-John F. Kennedy in the White House. By Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965. Pp. 1087.

$8.50.
By Theodore C. Sorensen. New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1965. Pp. 783. $10.00.
These two lengthy books are likely to constitute the official history of the
Kennedy Administration for any future writer (and there will be many) studying
the New Frontier. Theodore Sorensen, Special Assistant to President Kennedy,
was a participant or-at the very least-a listener in most of the fateful decisions
between 1961 and 1963. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.-a Pulitzer Prize-winning
former professor of history at Harvard-was also a Special Assistant to the
President. Although Mr. Schlesinger's relationship with the President appears to
have been considerably more distant than Mr. Sorensen's,' A Thousand Days
is by far the more readable book.
Schlesinger, the professional historian, has an instinctive feel for the proper
balance between "heavy" discussions of, for instance, conflicting theories about
KENNEDY.
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60 Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup.
Ct. 958 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General, 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 Schlesinger's scope of activity seems to have been more circumscribed than that of
Sorensen- Schlesinger's field of activity was primarily foreign affairs with some involvement in
civil rights, e.g., the draft of the statement exposing Governor Barnett's new Doctrine of
Nullification during the James Meredith crisis in Mississippi.
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NATO and, on the other hand, the light, gossipy tales of who fell into what
swimming pool on a gay summer evening. To be sure, one tires of being told
about the bloody marys consumed before a discussion of China policy on
J.F.K.'s boat. But-by way of comparison-with Theodore Sorensen we find
ourselves plodding through pageloads of uninteresting prose and some very
desperate attempts at humor which come off badly.
It is Schlesinger who writes-about the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting
in Vienna, for example-with a flair for both detail and the dramatic: "And so
on to Austria, the great plane touching down at the Vienna airport on a gray
and rainy Saturday morning."2 And then follows an involved discussion of
what these two leaders quoted to each other and how each one responded to
every argument advanced against his own country. Khrushchev announced that:
"The only rule was that they [political ideas] should not be propagated by arms
nor by intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. He would guarantee
that the Soviet Union would never impose ideas by war.... Kennedy quoted

Mao Tse-tung's remark that power came out of the end of the rifle. Khrushchev
blandly denied that Mao ever said this; Mao was a Marxist and Marxists were
against war."' When one culls all the evidence about this important meeting,
it becomes clear that the so-called "kitchen debate" between Khrushchev and
Nixon and, for that matter, the Kennedy-Nixon television debates of 1960both having been public events-pale into insignificance as serious discussions
of the issues. One wonders on how many occasions statesmen have engaged in
this type of exhausting exchange, which was in this case a verbal "prelude" to
the Berlin Wall and the crisis that surrounded that event.
As might be expected, both Schlesinger and Sorensen are highly sympathetic
to the Kennedy Administration's viewpoints regarding the motives of the Soviet
Union and other matters of public concern. They are chroniclers of an era in
which eight years of sluggish economic growth, presidential apathy about the
civil rights of Negroes, and the quasi-religious condemnation of neutral nations
by Eisenhower, and especially Dulles, all became policies of the past to be replaced by government which was comparatively rational and progressive. Five
years under the Administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have highlighted the intellectual bankruptcy which gripped the previous Administration.
As an illustration, Schlesinger quotes Eisenhower on deficit spending:
In May of 1963 President Eisenhower in an agitated magazine article
expressed his "amazement" about this "vast, reckless" plan for "a deliberate plunge into a massive deficit. 'What can those people in Washington be thinking about? Why would they deliberately do this to our
country?' I asked myself." 4
Of John F. Kennedy's accomplishments, one of the most impressive is that
he was the first President to put the moral weight of the Executive branch firmly
behind the proposition that "separate but equal" is not equal but rather a
travesty, an outrage against any conceivable notion of justice or equity. Another
2

3

4

SCHLESINGER, text at 358.
SCHLESINGER, text at 360.
SCHLESINGER, text at 1004.
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is that for the first time, neutral nations such as many African countries - ever
so recently freed from the bonds of colonialism - could identify with a United
States which attempted to identify itself with the emergent new nationalisms.
President Kennedy's thousand days set into motion events and ideas which
were the antithesis of so much that was characteristic of the postwar years of
slumber. Yet, at the same time, one cannot claim more than the record will
support. Schlesinger, for instance, is slightly overzealous when he speaks of
the "spirit" of the New Frontier at its inception:
[L]ike the New Dealers a quarter century earlier, they brought with them
the ideas of national reconstruction and reform which had been germinating
under the surface of a decade of inaction. They had stood by too long
while a complacent government had ignored the needs and potentialities
of the nation-a nation whose economy was slowing down and whose
population was overrunning its public facilities and services; a nation
where victims of racism and poverty lived on in sullen misery and the
ideals held out by the leaders of the people were parochial and mediocre.
Now the New Frontiersmen swarmed in from State governments, the
universities, the foundations, the newspapers, determined to complete the
unfinished business of American society. Like Rexford G. Tugwell in
another age, they proposed to roll up their sleeves and make America over.'
We can properly excuse the Kennedy Administration for failing to proceed
beyond racial discrimination in the South to dealing with the seemingly intractable problem of the ghettos of the North. The same goes for tax reform and
a direct attack on maldistribution of income. There was not enough time and
the narrow margin which Northern Democrats had in Congress hardly made
the time propitious. But how far were the sleeves rolled up when antitrust action
contemplated against U.S. Steel, after the 1962 steel price dispute, was halted
when Big Steel rescinded its increases? This was rationalized, according to Sorensen, on the grounds that the prestige of the presidency was no longer directly
involved. While one cannot underestimate the Administration's achievement in
this affair, surely the effort was a bit on the short side of "making America over."
One can hardly cover all the events discussed in these books which concern
those three short years: the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba where Kennedy was
plainly misled by his advisors (Schlesinger quotes Kennedy: " 'If someone comes
in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill,' Kennedy said to me
later, 'I have no hesitation in overruling them. But you always assume that the
military and intelligence people have some secret skills not available to ordinary
mortals.'"); Vietnam, where Kennedy said it was their war to be won, and expressed the view that he had not devoted sufficient time to that tragic country's
problems; and finally, civil rights. About President Kennedy and the Negro
Revolution, Sorensen has this to say: "John Kennedy did not start that revolution and nothing he could have done could have stopped it. But in 1963, he
befriended and articulated its high aspirations, and helped guide its torrential
currents." 6
5
6
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Whether Kennedy or Johnson or anyone is the Great Emancipator of this
century is almost beside the point. For, as Anthony Lewis has written: "When
John Kennedy died on November 22, 1963, the commitment of the Federal
Government to the cause of civil rights--a commitment legal, political and moral
' 7
-was complete."
Is not this legacy a sufficient one?
William B. Gould*
THE

The Story of the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Negro. By Loren Miller. New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. Pp.
ix, 461. $8.95. Poorer than poor have been the Negroes in America.
Thus, a book recounting the Supreme Court's justice to them is appropriate for
review in this Symposium issue. That the Negro's problem has been far beyond
that of poverty, however, is illustrated by the Scottsboro cases of the 1930's.2
Caught in the Depression, jobless Negro and white youths, including two
white girls, were bumming a ride on a freight train in Alabama. A racial fight
broke out, and all but one of the white boys were chased or thrown off the train.
Some of the white boys complained to law enforcement officers, who stopped
the train and jailed the Negroes. The white girls alleged that they had been
raped by six of the Negroes. After two years of litigation during which the
Negroes had successfully appealed from the first guilty verdict, one of the white
girls changed her story. She denied having been raped and testified that she had
not seen the other girl raped. A white boy corroborated this version. Nevertheless, the all-white jury returned another guilty verdict.
Racial prejudice tipped the scale of Southern justice in favor of the poor
whites against the equally poor Negroes. To be sure, the Negroes in the Scottsboro cases, as Judge Miller points out, were well defended by Clarence Darrow
and Samuel Leibowitz, and well financed by the NAACP and the "Communistoriented" International Labor Defense 3 However, it is to be doubted that the
special protection sometimes afforded by the NAACP and like-minded organizations has placed the poor Negro on a parity with the poor white in Southern
courts.
While the last-hired and first-fired Negro knows poverty well, being no
stranger to that impediment to justice, he has an additional and more onerous
burden. Prejudice, more than poverty, has frustrated his quest for justice in
which he has sought from the law recognition as a person. As Judge Miller
writes:
PETITIONERS:

MIhe Negro's long struggle for what he calls first-class citizenship has been,
and is, nothing more or less than an effort to gain status as an individual,

7
*

LiEvs,

PORTRAIT OF A DECADE

Member, Michigan Bar.

124 (1965).

1 Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935);
and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2 Text at 266-76.
3 Text at 270.
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as a person, because it is only as a person that he can claim the rights,
privileges, and protections enjoyed by white Americans who are born as
persons.4
This book, ambitious in scope and temperate in language, traces the Negro's
"effort to gain status as an individual, as a person," through a detailed history
of selected Supreme Court decisions. At the outset, Judge Miller acknowledges
the risk of distortion in treating any issue in isolation. Furthermore, he warns
that his effort to be objective should not induce the reader to forget that his
viewpoint is that of an "embattled advocate of complete equality." 5 It is to his
credit that the book largely succeeds in spite of a certain amount of unintentional
distortion.
Most troublesome is the exaggerated importance and dark motivation frequently attached to Supreme Court decisions. For example, the Dred Scott
case6 is said to have hastened the Civil War.' There is no evidence that the
decision had this effect, and none is cited. Again, it is said that the Court's
interpretation of the War Amendments and their supplementary civil rights
legislation amounted to a "wholesale undoing of the congressional will. ....s
[It] reflected both a deep hostility to the national legislative view of Reconstruction and an obvious determination to re-establish judicial supremacy,
so badly damaged by congressional and popular reaction to the Dred Scott
case and the Court's dilatory conduct during and after the Civil War. That
the Court re-established its supremacy at the expense of the Negro need
occasion no surprise; the strong traditionally use the weak as stepping
stones to power." 9
One need not defend these Supreme Court decisions in order to take exception to this characterization. The fact is that the Supreme Court decisions
reflected a popular view among white Americans. The wounds of a great Civil
War could not be healed by continued occupation of the South. The withdrawal of the troops meant the collapse of the radical program of the Reconstructionists and the resignation of the Negro to the care of the South. This
was accomplished pursuant to the compromise of 1876. The Supreme Court
decisions were consistent with the dominant national view, which soon regarded
the radicals' social restructuring as ineffectual. In short, although the decisions
may have been incorrect, one cannot infer from this an attempt to establish
judicial supremacy at the expense of the Negro. This is not to suggest, though,
that the Court and the "cdmpromisers" are not chargeable with a grave moral
insensitivity.
Judge Miller rightly stresses the importance of Brown v. Board of Educ1
However, he wrongly criticizes as naive the decision to implement desegregation with "deliberate speed."' 1 He argues that since immediate implemen4
5
6
7
8
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Dred
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at 116.
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tation would have been blocked by Southern obstructionists, a gradualist approach only "armed the recalcitrant states with a built-in device for delay and
resistance ...."' His contention is bolstered by the scant integration accomplished since the Brown case, but that is to argue from hindsight. It ignores the
anticipated practical difficulties involved in immediate compliance, or it grossly
underestimates them.
A number of minor criticisms can be made. Judge Miller annoyingly suggests, and then backs away from his suggestion, that seven of the Justices who
decided Plessy v. Ferguson" were influenced by former business connections
with railroads." He has a tendency to lapse into colloquialisms which jar the
reader (e.g., "Supreme Court judges occasionally get all shook up").1 .He
confuses two Supreme Court quotations.1 Mr. Justice Arthur Goldberg is
referred to as "Justice Albert Goldberg."' 7 Finally, the Missouri Compromise
is discussed without mentioning the admission of Maine.'
On balance, however, this is a solid book, reflecting immense research and
skilled handling of intricate legal questions. It is eminently readable and frequently provocative. As a petition, listing repetitively the Negro's plea for recognition of personal rights invariably taken for granted by white citizens, the cumulative effect is quite moving.
John A. Lucido*
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* Member, New York Bar. Mr. Lueido was Editor-in-Chief of Volume 40 of the Lawyer.
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